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David Cameron, the European Commission and the OECD have all promised to get tough on tax avoidance in
response to the Panama Papers leak. Any measures they take will be part of an international political process begun
almost 20 years ago at the OECD, the organisation charged by the G8 and more recently the G20 to develop
international standards as part of the fight against tax avoidance and evasion. To understand the significance of the
Panama papers, we need to understand that process.
In his account of the OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition project, Jason Sharman describes how its initial ambitions
were watered down to what Tax Analysts’ Martin Sullivan refers to as “a series of toothless pronouncements, a
mixture of cheerleading and scorekeeping.” In 1998, an ambitious initial report set out a now classic definition of ‘tax
haven’, but subsequent work focused on only one of its four elements; a list of ‘uncooperative tax havens’ published
in 2000 was gradually emptied despite many of the problems identified by the OECD still existing.
According to Sharman, this failure came about because the OECD lost a battle of ideas and language, not an
economic (or, for that matter, military) one. “The technocratic identity of the OECD as an international organisation
comprised of ‘apolitical’ experts” resulted in a battle waged in a rhetorical and normative space – over the definition
of ‘international standards’ and who got blacklisted – rather than one dominated by the calculus of economic power.
“The OECD made the struggle with tax havens a rhetorical contest, that is, one centred on the public use of
language to achieve political ends.” The OECD was able to do this not because of the economic dominance of its
members, but because of the secretariat’s use of “expert authority” to create influential regulative norms.
Opponents forced the OECD to abandon key planks of the project by turning its rhetorical weapons against it. They
portrayed the OECD’s proposal of sanctions against tax havens as a contravention of the principle of fiscal
sovereignty; they turned the term ‘harmful tax competition’ back on the OECD, forcing it to defend its pro-tax
competition stance and eventually to replace the term with ‘harmful tax practices’; they alleged hypocrisy among
OECD countries, pointing to Luxembourg and Switzerland’s refusal to be bound by the project’s outcomes. If the
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project had been primarily a manifestation of raw state power, these rhetorical skirmishes would have mattered little
to the eventual outcome.
Turning to the Panama papers, the OECD continues to focus on its rhetorical influence. It has published a Q&A,
stating that the problem is “Panama’s consistent failure to fully adhere to and comply with international standards,”
unlike “almost all international financial centres including Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Jersey,
Singapore, and Switzerland.” The Q&A promises that:
As part of its ongoing fight against opacity in the financial sector, the OECD will continue monitoring Panama’s
commitment to and application of international standards, and continue reporting to the international community on
the issue.
On one hand, the OECD’s normative claims are more powerful in 2016 than in 1998 because its claim to be the
custodian of ‘international standards’ has more weight as a result of the increasing involvement of some non-OECD
countries in its various tax projects. On the other hand, the ongoing peer review approach seems to implicitly
concede a conservative notion of procedural fairness (reasonable behaviour, again) towards secrecy jurisdictions.
And the allegations of hypocrisy among its members don’t help its authority.
Furthermore, the suggestion that Panama is an outlier doesn’t quite hold water, because the Panama papers story is
also about the other financial centres that were used by Mossack Fonseca, most of which are rated as “ largely
compliant” with international standards by the Global Forum, the OECD satellite body that peer reviews countries in
this area.
That they were being used by Mossack Fonseca does not necessarily contradict the OECD’s assessment that these
financial centres are now compliant. Arguably, the leaked papers show how the world was before the latest G20
intervention, which began in 2009, and as a result of which these jurisdictions have reformed, becoming more
transparent to tax authorities from other countries. There is certainly some evidence on the ICIJ’s data page to
support this view:
Mossack Fonseca’s clients have been rapidly deactivating companies since 2009, records show. The number of
incorporations of offshore entities has been in decline for the past four years.
But there is also a strong vein of informed commentary on the Panama Papers which argues that the leak
demonstrates the limits of the OECD’s ‘soft’ power approach: that it’s time to use some serious economic and (in the
UK’s case) legal power to overturn haven secrecy. That’s Global Witness’s position. France has wasted no time in
restoring Panama to its tax haven blacklist. According to former tax inspector Richard Brooks:
To tackle the cancer of corruption at the heart of the global financial system, tax havens need not just to reform but to
end. Companies, trusts and other structures constituted in this shadow world must be refused access to the real one,
so they can no longer steal money and wash it back in. No bank accounts, no property ownership, no access to legal
systems.
For political science, a core question is whether OECD tax projects stand and fall on the secretariat’s skill at owning
the rhetorical space, or whether we need to acknowledge governments’ material interests and incentives to fully
explain outcomes? In their commentary on the Panama papers, Len Seabrooke and Duncan Wigan, political
scientists who believe in the causal role of ideas, also emphasise latter, how “big, powerful states…themselves may
benefit from sheltering other countries’ hot money.”  Answering that question might help us resolve a second one:
can the problem of offshore tax avoidance and evasion ever be fully addressed through the OECD’s technical,
normative and rhetorical modus operandi?
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This post gives the views of its author, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London School of
Economics.
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